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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that a  common fiscal policy, designed to 
support the euro currency, has some significant drawbacks. The greatest danger is the possibility of leveling 
the tax burden in all countries. This leveling of the tax is to the disadvantage of countries in Eastern Europe, 
in principle, countries poorly endowed with capital, that use a lax fiscal policy (Romania, Bulgaria, etc.) to 
attract foreign investment from rich countries of the European Union. In addition, common fiscal policy can 
lead to a higher degree of centralization of budgetary expenditures in the European Union. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic crisis that affected the global economy after 2007 manifested in the European 
Union as a crisis of confidence in the euro and in the monetary policy of the Eurozone. The main 
causes of this crisis of confidence in the European institutions was created by the trend to cover 
budget deficits through direct purchase of government bonds and by the increasing pressure exerted 
by some EU countries for debt syndication. Basically, after the onset of the economic crisis, many 
governments have abandoned the convergence criteria which provided strong conditions to ensure 
the stability of the single currency, the budget deficits of national government reaching impressive 
levels. The logical conclusion of supporters of European integration was that a common monetary 
policy can be effective if supported by a common fiscal policy (Allard et al., 2013). Thus, in recent 
years, there is increasing pressure exerted by the most important EU countries to adopt and to 
accept  a  common  fiscal  policy.  Basically,  there  is  a  strong  trend  in  favoring  the  idea  that  the 
safeguarding of the single currency depends on the design and implementation of a common fiscal 
policy to  enforce compliance with  the convergence criteria,  abandoned in  recent  years, which 
threatens the common monetary policy (Cottarelli, 2013). The role of this paper is to show that such 
a policy can be especially harmful to the poorer countries of Eastern Europe, that try to use the low 
level of tax as a comparative advantage for attracting foreign investment, taking into account that 
they have to that face a relative shortage of capital.   
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3. TAXATION – METHOD FOR ATTRACTING CAPITAL  
 
The economic integration under the umbrella of the European Union has many advantages for 
the citizens of the member states. The free movement of goods, services, capital and labor has 
allowed  an  increasing  prosperity  for  most  European  citizens.  However,  the  integration  of  the 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  and  of  the  three  Baltic  countries  (Latvia,  Estonia  and  Lithuania) 
revealed a significant difference in the welfare of the citizens of Western countries  and of the 
citizens from the former communist countries. One of the main causes of this difference is the 
different degree of capital endowment. The EU founding countries are rich because they have tried 
to create the institutional conditions for capital accumulation, which can be seen in the average 
standard  of  living  of  citizens  in  countries  like  France,  Italy,  Germany,  Belgium  and  UK.  The 
significant  amount  of  accumulated  capital  allowed  these  nations  to  significantly  increase  labor 
productivity, which contributed to an impressive growth of income per capita. In the same time, the 
former communist countries have failed to create a climate for a significant capital accumulation, 
which resulted in a low standard of living of their citizens. Thus, in the EU there are significant 
differences of prosperity, whose fundamental cause is the capital stock. However, this reality is a 
disadvantage for the nations of Eastern Europe, because the businesses and the citizens of these 
areas  compete with  the wealthier Western nations.  One of the  fundamental tools  used by  East 
European governments to reduce these gaps is a lax fiscal policy, evidenced by a relatively low 
rates of taxation. To stimulate the coming of foreign investment, the Eastern governments have 
designed and implemented fiscal policies that provided low taxes. 
Therefore, the taxes have become a competitive advantage for attracting capital from rich 
Western countries of the European Union. This policy was a succefully one because, in recent 
decades, the Western countries have seen the fiscal policy as a method of wealth redistribution, 
from those with significant wealth to those with low incomes. Or, to  be able to achieve these 
redistributive goals, the Western European governments have applied progressive rates of taxation, 
significantly increasing the share of national income spent by public institutions. Thus, in terms of 
fiscal  policy,  between  the  Western  and  Eastern  countries  of  European  Union  there  are  two 
significant differences: a relatively high tax rate in the West and a relatively low tax rate in the East. 
In addition, the poor countries such as Romania and Bulgaria have tried to build a comparative 
advantage in eliminating the progressive tax policy taxation and introducing to a flat tax. Thus, the 
relatively poor countries of East try to attract capital from the richer countries of European Union,  
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which are well equipped with capital but using high taxes, hoping thus may face fierce competition 
in the common market.  
 
Tabel 1 - Tax rate on corporate income in EU (2013) 
Highest Rates   Rate (%)  Lowest Rates    (%) 
France  36.1  Bulgaria  10 
Belgium  34  Cyrprus  10 
Portugal  31.5  Estonia  15 
Italy  31.4  Lithuania  15 
Spain  30  Romania  16 
Germany  29.8  Slovenia  17 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Tabel 2 - Personal income tax rates in EU (2013) 
Highest Rates  Rate (%)  Lowest Rates    (%) 
Sweden  56.6   Bulgaria  10 
Denmark  55.6  Lithuania  15 
Belgium  53.7  Romania  16 
Portugal  53  Hungary  16 
Spain  52  Estonia  22 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Tabel 3. Total Taxes as % of GDP (2011) 
Highest Rates  Rate (%)  Lowest Rates    (%) 
Denmark  47.7  Lithuania  26 
Sweden  44.3  Bulgaria  27.2 
Belgium  44.1  Latvia  27.6 
France  43.9  Romania  28.2 
Finland  43.4  Slovakia  28.5 
Italy  42.5  Ireland  28.9 
Source: Eurostat 
As it can be seen from the above tables, the Eastern countries of the European Union tried to 
create a comparative advantage in significant lowering of taxes, as reflected in a relatively low tax 
burden (Eurostat, 2013) .  
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A careful analysis of these data reveals a very interesting thing, namely, that, in principle, 
the fiscal policy applied between Western and Eastern countries of the European Union presents 
significant differences, both in terms of capital taxation, in terms of personal income and generally 
in  terms  of  overall  pressure  exerted  by  fiscal  instruments  on  revenue.  The  overall  differences 
between the two parts of the EU are clearly reflected when comparing the highest taxation level 
(Denmark) and the lowest taxation level (Lithuania). Basically, this degree of disparity achieves a 
huge level (83.4 %) when comparing the two countries of European Union. 
In fact, the disparity between the rich and influential EU countries and the recently integrated 
nations of the East underlie the intention to impose a common fiscal policy. In a free market, such 
as the EU common market, the capital and the labor force move to areas where the net incomes are 
highest (Capie, 2004). However, these depend on the size of the net income taxes. As it can be seen 
from the previous tables, there is a significant difference between the taxes imposed in the two areas 
of the European Union. As a result, the capital owners have a natural tendency to move eastward in 
order to escape the tax burden from the Western areas of the Union. But this West - East transfer of 
capital tends to increase the interest rates in Western countries, which inhibit the economic growth 
and the job creation, generating a high unemployment rate, a diminishing of the income levels and 
increasing pressure on social security expenditures. 
To avoid these undesirable effects of capital movement, supported by the fact that in principle 
the Eastern countries have a relatively cheap labor force, the Western countries, more politica lly 
powerful in the EU institutions, try to impose a common tax policy, using the pretext of returning to 
the convergence criteria, to support the common monetary policy in order to safeguard the euro and 
to enforce the political and economic integration of countries from the European Union. 
 
4. DISADVANTAGES OF A COMMON FISCAL POLICY 
 
The  main  argument  of  the  supporters  of  the  common  fiscal  policy  is  to  supervise  the 
governmental budgets of the member states, seen as an instrument to keep budget deficits under a 
strict  control,  which  enables  to  fulfill  the  criteria  for  joining  the  euro  for  all  countries  of  the 
European Union.  In other words, the central institutions of the Union would impose a tougher 
budget discipline, which would ensure the stability of the single currency. During the last economic 
crisis, the huge spending of national governments, their inability to generate additional revenue led 
to significant budget deficits in many countries, which had created inflationary pressures that have 
weakened the position of the single currency. Therefore, the European Union policymakers have  
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concluded that the stability of the euro depends on the control of deficits of the member countries. 
Consequently,  they  launched  the  idea  that  the  sustainability  of  the common  monetary  policy, 
designed  and  implemented  by  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  depends  on  the  unification  of 
national fiscal policies in a common fiscal policy (Enderlein et al., 2012). This argument seems 
reasonable,  but  it  is  not  strong  enough  becau se  the  most  influential  countries  of  the  European 
Union, for example, France and Germany, have different views about the role of budget deficits to 
stimulate economic activity. Basically, Germany is part of the countries advocating for a relatively 
tough budgetary discipline, while nations like France and Italy are rather followers of inflationism, 
that is, of a lax fiscal policy. The idea of a common fiscal policy as a means of keeping control 
budget deficits, which tend to create inflation, to generate instability of the euro and the rise of 
interest rates in Eurozone, appears to be based on erroneous arguments. 
In fact,  the Western  countries try to  impose a  common fiscal  policy to avoid  moving the 
capital to the East of the European Union in order to escape the high tax burden in countries like 
France,  Belgium,  Italy  and  Spain.  An  eastward  migration  of  capital  generates  negative  for  the 
Western  countries.  First,  the  Western  governments  can  not  collect  incomes  because  the  capital 
flight.  In  principle,  the  French  capital  moving  to  Romania  generates  taxable  income  in  the 
destination country. The French government loses revenues in behalf of Romanian government. 
Secondly, the movement of capital rises the interest rates in France and it diminishes the interes t 
rates in Romania. However, the higher interest rates would adversely affect the level of investment, 
output, income and employment, which creates additional pressure on social security systems so 
ineffective in the Western countries. A high unemployment rate and a low level of personal income 
generates additional political pressure on governments in Western Europe, a pressure that could 
lead either to a decrease in public spending or an increase in the tax burden, both difficult to support 
by any democratic government. 
Therefore, the rich and the powerful countries of the European Union have no interest in a lax 
fiscal policy used by the new countries of the EU as a competitive method to raise capital. This is 
the real reason they are declared adherents of a common fiscal policy. Obviously, they gain from 
the  implementation  of  such  measures.  However,  both  the  owners  of  capital  and  the  Eastern 
countries will lose if it will be implemented effectively because they lose a comparative advantage 
in the dispute with the West. 
A  real  common  fiscal  policy  means  the  same  level  of  taxation  in  the  European  Union. 
However, the main losers of such a policy will be the Eastern countries, which in the absence of 
high  levels  of  savings  can  not  quickly  accumulate  capital  in order  to  compete  with  Western  
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companies and citizens; in fact, their only opportunity to increase productivity and prosperity in the 
short and medium term is to create favorable conditions for attracting capital from the rich areas of 
Europe. A common fiscal policy would destroy this comparative advantage, because it is hard to 
think that the Western countries will accept the lowering of the tax burden of their own countries. 
A common fiscal policy would require the leveling of the different degrees of fiscal pressure 
now existing in the 28 countries member. However, this leveling will increase taxes and public 
spending  in  Eastern  countries,  not  cutting  the  taxes  and  government  spending  in  the  Western 
countries. The governments of the Western European Union support an impressive public sector 
and a social security system extremely cumbersome, producing benefits for well-organized pressure 
groups  and  for  different  categories  of  voters  of  different  parties.  Therefore,  a  cutting  of  the 
governmental expenditures will generate immediate effects on the political and economic status quo 
of these countries. A significant reduction of public expenditure would involve a profound reform 
of economic, political and social systems in the Western world, reforms that would im pose huge 
costs for politicians. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that they would accept a significant decrease 
of public expeditures, in order to sustain a significant reduction of the tax burden. In addition, these 
countries are the most powerful political forces in the European institutions, which gives them a 
great advantage in relation to the new members, the Eastern countries. Consequently, a common 
fiscal  policy  will  increase  the  taxes  in  Eastern  Europe  at  a  level  close  to  that  of  the  Western 
countries. But if this happens, the Eastern countries lose a relatively efficient way to increase the 
living standards of their citizens. 
A single tax system would prevent the movement of capital to the poorest areas of Europe 
because this transfer always involves a cost. Under the current conditions, with varying degrees of 
tax between different parts of the EU, these costs are outweighed by the benefits of placing capital 
due to lower taxes in the East. A common fiscal policy would lead to the disappearance  of these 
differences and thus eliminates capital gains from relocation. In an integrated economic system, the 
free movement of goods, services, capital and labor force removes some of the disparities between 
its different areas, it allows inputs to move from areas where they are relatively abundant to those 
where are relatively scarce. Through their free movement, the inputs eliminate the disparities of 
economic development, making the entire system more homogeneous in terms of the prosperity of 
its members, in fact, a major goal in the European Union. In practice, this would mean perpetuating 
inequalities of wealth between the member countries, which would make the European Union a 
heterogeneous economic space. The logic of the European common market is deepening division of  
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labor and stimulating exchanges, but for something to happen it is necessary that competition must 
be an essential vehicle of resource allocation, and therefore of the capital. 
A common fiscal policy equalizes the taxes and eliminate the tax competition as a mean of an 
efficient capital investment. The main losers after its introduction will be both the Eastern European 
countries and the Western European capital owners. By the rising taxes in the Eastern part of the 
European Union, the Western capital will remain in their countries of origin because its results will 
be taxed to the same extent anywhere in the 28 member states. The Eastern economies will lose an 
extremely important opportunity for modernization. In these circumstances, the cost of relocation 
from  West  to  East  will  eliminate  the  benefits  transfer.  Secondly,  the  capital  owners  will  lose 
because they will have to settle for lower yields in Western countries, where the relative abundance 
of capital makes generates relatively low capital incomes. But in the Western world, the capital is 
quite democratized, it come from a large number of individuals that save money, from ordinary 
employees  to  the  traditional  owners  of  financial  funds.  The  high  incomes  of  Western  countries 
create the opportunity to save more and to place the savings in the financial system, banks, pension 
funds, investment funds, these amounts of being used by investors. When the free movement of 
capital is restricted by artificial barriers, for example, by standardizing the size of taxes between 
different parts of an economic system, all these individuals who save money are discouraged. Thus, 
a policy of uniform tax system in the European Union will result in a downward trend in the savings 
of the Western countries and a decreasing capital returns in this area of the world. However, a lower 
gain of capital will determine the trend of destroying it. 
The tax competition should be one of the most important tools to compete in an integrated 
economic system (Teather, 2005). It is needed in order to stimulate the movement of capital to the 
deficient areas in this regard. Moreover, the EU countries should leave fiscal policy to the local or 
regional authorities, because the capital endowment differences occur not only between different 
EU countries, but also between regions of different countries. Thus, the fiscal policy must be a tool 
used by every region of a nation to solve their own problems with capital equipment; it must not be 
an instrument used by the national governments and by supranational structures like the European 
Union (Kay, 2011). 
A common fiscal policy contradicts a basic principle of the European Union, the  subsidiarity,  
as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, claiming that decisions are taken 
by entities located as close as possible to the citizen. Between the desire to level taxes, to supervise 
the national budgets by the central bodies of the European Union and the alleged decentralization 
claimed by its principles of organization there is a glaring contradiction. Apparently, the control of  
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the EU bureaucracy on national or regional budgets try to avoid excessive budget deficits, which 
under a common monetary policy and a single currency can generate inflationary pressures; b ut 
inflation leads to arbitrary transfers of wealth between countries. Actually, the express desire to 
supervise the national and local budgets leads to an excessive centralization of decision making 
related  to  spending  the  public  revenues.  The  way  of  spen ding  the  revenues  created  by  citizens 
depends on decisions made by entities as far as possible from them. The immediate consequence of 
this  action  is  the  loss  of  real  control  over  the  use  of  the  tax  revenues,  leading  to  discretionary 
expenditures and to a reckless use of the taxpayers income. By such a policy, the welfare of the 
citizen in every part of the European Union depends on the anonymous bureaucracy in Brussels, not 
on the direct decisions of local representatives. 
By  applying  a  common  fiscal  policy,  the  European  Union's  founding  principles  does  not 
appear to undergo significant changes. In fact, the founding documents of this political structure 
provide the harmonious development of its component parts, consisting of countries and regions. 
But the fundamental difference introduced by a common fiscal policy refers to a definite way to 
achieve this ideal. When national and regional entities are free to use a fiscal policy, the process of 
reducing the development  gaps is  based on the free market,  that is,  on tax cuts  stimulating the 
creation of a comparative advantage in attracting capital. The relatively poor countries or areas of 
the European Union can attract capital from the rich ones. By this method, the local authorities 
create the opportunity of the free movement of capital, the final decision being made by the owners 
or investors. With a common fiscal policy, the process of reducing development disparities between 
countries or regions depends on political decision of central EU institutions. In o ther words, the 
capital moves through European investments, driven by political decisions made by those who are 
part of the bureaucracy of this new supranational structures. The major disadvantage of the method 
of resource allocation policy is to ignore economic efficiency imposed by scarcity. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The recent discussions about the introduction of a common fiscal policy must be viewed with 
much skepticism. In principle, its role is to strengthen the position of the euro through an additional 
mechanism to respect the convergence criteria, a position weakened during the economic crisis of 
recent years. Unfortunately, a common fiscal policy generates many disadvantages especially for 
the poor countries of the European Union, which tried to improve the prosperity of their citizens  
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through a lax fiscal policy, which aims to attract foreign capital. The low rates of taxation in the 
Eastern countries have attracted capital from the Western Europe, allowing a gradual reduction of 
the development gap that separated and still separates the two regions of the European continent. 
The introduction of a common fiscal policy would lead to the loss of this comparative advantage 
and would seriously hamper the financing of the economies of Eastern Europe. This policy would 
clear disadvantages the Western capital owners and it discourages the saving in this rich area of the 
European Union. The equalization of tax rates would hamper the free movement of an essential 
factor  of  production,  reducing  the  overall  efficiency  of   resource  allocation  processes  in  the  28 
member states. A common fiscal policy would lead to an excessive centralization of decisions in the 
European  Union,  seriously  affecting  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  in  the  allocation  of  scarce 
resources. 
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